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ARTICLES 
JUSTICE WILLIAM J. BRENNAN AND 
THE WARREN COURT 
Robert C. Post * 
Justice William J. Brennan's eminent, if not pre-eminent, posi-
tion in the annals of the Warren Court is now well established. The 
depth and clarity of his vision, the lucidity of its doctrinal expres-
sion, and his uncanny knack for creating crucial court majorities 
from the splinters of disparate perspectives have all been amply doc-
umented. In the words of one commentator, "To the extent that 
the Court over which Warren presided has any intellectual legacy 
that is accessible to those trained in doctrine and not in ethics, it is 
Brennan who is responsible." 1 In this essay I shall attempt to iso-
late and assess Brennan's distinct contribution to that legacy. 
The immense influence of the Warren Court on American con-
stitutional law can ultimately be traced to three discrete achieve-
ments: The reconstruction of constitutional law on individualist 
principles; the redesign of doctrine based upon a pragmatic concep-
tion of legal rules; and the vigorous articulation and revivification of 
egalitarian values. Although Justice William J. Brennan impor-
tantly participated in all three of these achievements, his work as a 
Justice was particularly decisive for the first two. 
BRENNAN AND THE LOGIC OF INDIVIDUALISM 
When Brennan was appointed in October, 1956, Brown v. 
Board of Education,2 perhaps the most important decision of the 
Warren Court, had already been decided. The principle of equality, 
whose awesome power in our democracy had long ago been theo-
rized by de Tocqueville, had been unleashed. Brennan concurred in 
• Professor of Law, School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California at Berkeley. 
This essay was originally delivered at a conference on The Warren Court: A Historical Per-
spective, sponsored in January 1990 by the Georgetown University Law Center. 
I. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81 MICH. L. 
REV. 922, 924 (1983). 
2. 346 u.s. 483 (1954). 
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that principle. Indeed he has since remarked that "the equality 
principle ... is the rock upon which our Constitution rests. . . . The 
judicial pursuit of equality is, in my view, properly regarded to be 
the noblest mission of judges; it has been the primary task of judges 
since the repudiation of economic substantive due process as our 
central constitutional concem."3 During the Warren Court era 
Brennan strongly supported and developed the equality principle in 
major opinions like Cooper v. Aaron 4 and Green v. County School 
Board.s But in these efforts, as he himself recognized, he was ulti-
mately carrying forward-albeit enthusiastically, creatively and 
forcefully-a task assumed before his appointment. 
The importance of this task had been foreseen by de Toc-
queville, who presciently argued that the people of the United States 
would evince "a more ardent and enduring love of equality than of 
liberty."6 This point was astonishingly unappreciated by Herbert 
Wechsler when in 1959 he criticized Brown as not involving a ques-
tion "of discrimination at all," but rather one of "freedom of associ-
ation."? Precisely because in the end the Warren Court 
subordinated the latter to the former, it cannot strictly be called 
"libertarian" in sentiment. 
It is more accurate to characterize the perspective of the War-
ren Court as "individualist." And "individualism," as de Toc-
queville also explained, is not only compatible with, but directly 
implied by, the principle of equality. In fact de Tocqueville argued 
that "individualism is of democratic origin, and it threatens to 
spread in the same ratio as the equality of conditions."s Individual-
ism and equality are linked because the institution of democracy 
creates pressure to measure equality in terms of individual persons. 
By the end of the Warren Court, it is true, glimpses could be 
caught of a form of equality measured in terms of groups rather 
than individuals.9 Brennan's own opinion in Green rejecting a 
"freedom-of-choice" school desegregation plan is a prime example. 
In the years after the Warren Court the difference between these 
3. Brennan, The Equality Principle: A Foundation of American Law, 20 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 673, 673-74 (1987). 
4. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). On Brennan's role in the drafting of the Cooper, per curiam 
opinion, see B. ScHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 295-301 (1983). Schwartz concludes that the 
"chief credit" for Cooper "must go to Brennan." /d. at 301. 
5. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
6. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 99-103 (1945). 
7. H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 46-47 (1960). 
8. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 6, at 104. 
9. For a discussion of the difference between orienting law toward groups as compared 
to individuals, see Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the 
First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 299-305 (1988). 
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two forms of equality would lead to heated debates over affirmative 
action, 10 debates in which Brennan chiefly supported a concept of 
equality rooted in groups.11 But during the Warren Court this ten-
sion between equality and individualism remained largely latent, 
and among Brennan's most important contributions was to be the 
development and amplification of the logic of individualism. 
The nature of that logic and its connections to equality can 
perhaps best be seen in Brennan's opinion in Baker v. Carr, 12 which 
Earl Warren viewed as "the most important case of my tenure on 
the Court."D Baker concerned a lawsuit alleging that the gross 
malapportionment of the Tennessee legislature violated the Equal 
Protection Clause; the issue before the Court was whether such a 
lawsuit was justiciable, or whether it was, as prior precedents like 
Colegrove v. Green 14 construing the "Guaranty Clause" of the Con-
stitution1s had concluded, a "political question." Brennan's long 
and exegetical opinion in Baker conceded that suits based upon the 
Guaranty Clause were non-justiciable because the Clause did not 
offer "a repository of judicially manageable standards which a court 
could utilize." 16 But it insisted that, by contrast, "[j]udicial stan-
dards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and 
familiar,"11 and hence "that the complaint's allegations of a denial 
of equal protection present a justiciable constitutional cause of ac-
tion upon which [plaintiffs] are entitled to a trial and decision."1s 
Why did Brennan view the Equal Protection Clause as supply-
ing the judicial standards missing from the Guaranty Clause? The 
plaintiffs in Baker had alleged in their Complaint that Tennessee 
malapportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause because of 
a "debasement of their votes."19 But Justice Frankfurter trench-
antly noted in dissent that "[t]alk of 'debasement' or 'dilution' is 
circular talk. One cannot speak of 'debasement' or 'dilution' of the 
value of a vote until there is first defined a standard of reference as 
to what a vote should be worth."2o Necessarily implicit in Bren-
10. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). Compare Wygant 
v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281 n.8 (1986) (Opinion of Powell, J.), with id. at 309 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
II. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, I 10 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). 
12. 369 u.s. 186 (1962). 
13. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 309 (1977). 
14. 328 u.s. 549 (1946). 
15. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form 
of Government." U.S. CoNsT. an. IV, § 4. 
16. 369 U.S. at 223. 
17. /d. at 226. 
18. /d. at 237. 
19. /d. at 194. 
20. !d. at 300 (Frankfuner, J., dissenting). 
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nan's conclusion, therefore, was the notion that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause required "if not the assurance of equal weight to every 
voter's vote, at least the basic conception that representation ought 
to be proportionate to population, a standard by reference to which 
the reasonableness of apportionment plans may be judged."2t 
That legislative apportionment ought constitutionally to be 
based upon population, rather than upon geography, is not an obvi-
ous proposition in a country whose national Senate has since the 
eighteenth century represented States instead of people. It is the 
proposition, however, that underlies Brennan's opinion in Baker v. 
Ca". It is the proposition that would subsequently form "the foun-
dation," in Earl Warren's words, "upon which rest all subsequent 
decisions guaranteeing equal weight to the vote of every American 
citizen for representation in state and federal government. "22 
What lends the proposition its power and makes it exemplary 
of the Warren Court's jurisprudence, is its democratic, as distinct 
from republican, logic. If democracy is that form of regime in 
which the people ultimately choose their government, then equality 
must ultimately be measured in terms of persons. In this manner 
the Warren Court used the solvent of democracy to fuse equality 
with individualism. As Brennan would later remark, the Constitu-
tion "is a sparkling vision of the supreme dignity of every individ-
ual. This vision is reflected in the very choice of democratic self-
governance: the supreme value of a democracy is the presumed 
worth of each individual. "23 
The most salient characteristic of individualism is its focus on 
the individual as the privileged unit of social action. This focus has 
the powerful effect of delegitimating forms of social organization 
that do not flow from processes of individual choice. Thus the indi-
vidualism of Baker v. Carr, which would later find explicit expres-
sion in Warren's opinion in Reynolds v. Sims,24 undermines forms 
of representation that depend upon geography or upon maintaining 
an urban/rural balance. These forms of representation are entailed 
by visions of social identity that cannot be reduced to individual 
choice. By disallowing them the Warren Court essentially turned 
its back, as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent, "on the regard 
which this Court has always shown for the judgment of state legisla-
21. /d. 
22. Warren, Mr Justice Brennan, 80 HARV. L. REV. I, 2 (1966). 
23. Brennan, My Encounters with the Constitution, 26 JuDGES JoURNAL No. 3, 10 
(Summer 1987). Brennan wrote of Warren that '"[h]e strongly believed that individual 
human dignity was the primary value fostered and protected by the Constitution." Tribute to 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, California, April 8, 1989, at 3. 
24. 377 u.s. 533 (1964). 
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tures and courts on matters of basically local concern. "2s Individu-
alism, in other words, meant the death knell for federalism as a 
source of limitations on civil rights and liberties. 
Federalism is a form of cultural pluralism that privileges the 
diversity of local cultures.26 Individualism, on the other hand, priv-
ileges the diversity of persons, who are understood to choose or to 
create their cultures. From the perspective of individualism, it 
makes no sense to curtail individual freedom for the purpose of pro-
moting local culture. Similarly, for Brennan and the dominant 
members of the Warren Court, it was incomprehensible to appeal to 
federalism as a reason not to protect individual rights. In their eyes 
the very purpose of federalism, as Brennan told the Conference of 
Chief Justices in 1964, was to secure "individual freedom"27 a for-
mulation that Justices Frankfurter and Harlan would no doubt 
have found most distasteful. 
Brennan's disaffection with federalism was reinforced by his 
perception that "the rise of mass education and mass media of com-
munication" had in the "two decades since the end of World War 
II" materially contributed to the creation of a cultural uniformity 
inconsistent with the premises of federalism.2s He also perceived 
the most important social development of the time to be the growth 
of the state, creating the potential for "more and more collisions of 
the individual with his government."29 And he conceived govern-
ment not as a reflection of indigenous culture, but rather as an im-
personal "bureaucracy," as a rational deployment of state power.3o 
His primary concern, then, was the protection of persons in their 
conflict with government, and from this perspective it made no dif-
ference whether the government at issue was federal or state. 
It is for this reason that Brennan viewed the incorporation de-
cisions as "the most important of the Warren era."3I These deci-
sions, which applied the Bill of Rights against the States,32 crushed 
federalism as an effective counter to the logic of individual liberty. 
25. 369 U.S. at 332. 
26. See Post, supra note 9, at 301-05. 
27. Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945, 954 (1964). 
28. /d. at 960. 
29. /d. 
30. Brennan, Reason, Passion. and "The Progress of the Law. " 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 3, 
18-19 (1988). 
31. Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as 
Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 535-36 (1986). 
32. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (fourth amendment); Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (eighth amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) (sixth amendment); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964) (fifth amendment); Pointer v. 
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (sixth amendment); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 
(1967) (sixth amendment); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (sixth amendment); 
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Brennan viewed them as necessitated by the logic of both individu-
alism and equality. The decisions were made possible by the four-
teenth amendment, which thus " 'served as the legal instrument of 
the equalitarian revolution which has so transformed the contempo-
rary American society,' protecting each of us from the employment 
of governmental authority in a manner contravening our national 
conceptions of human dignity and liberty."33 By focusing on the 
individual as the privileged unit of legal and social analysis, the in-
corporation decisions eliminated local cultural variations. The deci-
sions were egalitarian because they insisted that all individuals 
throughout the nation be treated equally. The nationalism which 
was so characteristic of Warren Court jurisprudence can thus be 
seen as implied by its evacuation of the space between individuals 
and the federal government. 
The lengths to which Brennan was willing to take this nation-
alism was revealed in his important opinion in Shapiro v. Thomp-
son,34 from which even Earl Warren dissented. In Shapiro the 
Court invalidated regulations imposing one year residency require-
ments on welfare applicants. In Warren's view, the requirements 
had been approved by Congress, and, consistent with traditional 
New Deal nationalism, he was therefore prepared to hold that Con-
gress need only "have a rational basis for finding that a chosen regu-
latory scheme is necessary to the furtherance of interstate 
commerce."Js Brennan, on the other hand, revealing the distance 
he had traveled from the New Deal Court, concluded that the regu-
lations impinged upon the "fundamental" right to interstate travel, 
and were therefore a violation of the Equal Protection Clause unless 
justified by "a compelling governmental interest. "36 State attempts 
to use residency requirements to partition off local cultures were 
therefore precluded. In this manner the Warren Court, under Bren-
nan's lead, moved decisively to articulate a nationalism that went 
beyond notions of plenary congressional power, and derived instead 
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth 
amendment); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 704 (1969) (fifth amendment). 
Of these opinions, only Malloy was written by Brennan himself. Brennan has recounted 
with pride, however, that Malloy was the first of these decisions to decide a case "in explicitly 
incorporationist terms": "The Court's opinion in Malloy made clear that the rights and 
prohibitions nationalized in the past were now considered to apply to the states with full 
federal regalia intact." Brennan, supra note 30, at 543-44. 
33. Brennan, supra note 31, at 536 (quoting Schwartz, The Amendment in Operation: A 
Historical Overview, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 29, 30 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970)). 
34. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). On the fascinating genesis and history of the Shapiro opinion, 
see B. ScHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT 304-93 (1985). 
35. 394 U.S. at 651 (Warren, J., dissenting). 
36. /d. at 634, 638. 
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from a vision of individuals uniformly equal before the 
Constitution. 
The facts of Shapiro confirmed for Brennan his general analysis 
of contemporary society. The case concerned a contest between 
government, in its capacity as a large and unfeeling bureaucracy, 
and destitute welfare recipients, whose very necessities of life were 
being manipulated. The issue thus reduced to a conflict between 
individual freedom and the impersonal and administrative preroga-
tives of state power. For Brennan, the judiciary could assume a 
privileged role in this conflict. He believed that "the soul of a gov-
ernment of laws is the judicial function, and that function can only 
exist if adjudication is understood by our people to be, as it is, the 
essentially disinterested, rational and deliberate element of our soci-
ety."37 If the rationality of bureaucracy was for Brennan tainted 
with organizational self-interest, he viewed the reason of courts as 
in contrast detached and trustworthy. Courts were somehow dis-
tinct from government. Because they embodied disinterested rea-
son, they could be trusted to mediate the conflict between 
government and individuals.3s 
The judicial application of disinterested reason was for Bren-
nan immensely important. "I do not think there can be any chal-
lenge," he said, "to the proposition that the ultimate protection of 
individual freedom is found in court enforcement of ... constitu-
tional guarantees."39 Public interest litigation was thus for Brennan 
"a form of political expression" designed to make manifest and ef-
fective the principles of equality and individualism. 40 Indeed, 
"under the conditions of modem government, litigation may well be 
the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition for redress 
of grievances."4t 
These considerations prompted Brennan to give great priority 
to enlarging litigants' access to federal courts. He took the lead in 
the Warren Court in devising doctrinal strategies that would undo 
or circumvent prior restrictions on that access. He wrote the 
Court's opinion in Fay v. Noia,42 for example, which radically re-
vised the rules governing federal habeas corpus and made federal 
relief available in numerous instances where it heretofore would 
37. Brennan, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Advocate for Human Need in American Juris-
prudence, 40 Mo. L. REv. 390, 395 (1981). 
38. Seven years later Brennan would argue that courts could not rely on "reason 
alone," but must instead display "the passions that understand the pulse of life beneath the 
official version of events." Brennan, supra note 30, at 22. 
39. Brennan, supra note 27, at 954. 
40. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). 
41. /d. at 430. 
42. 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
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have been barred. Brennan rested his conclusion on a recognition 
of "the unceasing contest between personal liberty and government 
oppression," and on the necessity that "in a civilized society, gov-
ernment must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's 
imprisonment."43 He specifically rejected "the exigencies of feder-
alism" as a countervailing consideration, holding that these should 
not "be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal 
constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without 
the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."44 Other 
examples of Brennan's determination to open up the federal courts 
during the Warren Court era include Dombrowski v. Pfister,4s which 
increased the availability of federal injunctive relief, Henry v. Missis-
sippi,46 which limited the adequate state grounds doctrine, and Eng-
land v. Medical Examiners,47 which limited the reach of federal 
court abstention.4s 
In this regard Baker v. Ca" is of course exemplary. Although 
the decision is on the surface narrowly focused on a seemingly tech-
nical question of justiciability, in fact the question entails the whole 
issue of the enforceability of the substantive principles of individual-
ism and equality. Because state courts could not be expected to 
adopt the nationalist perspectives implied by these principles, the 
substantive agenda of the Warren Court would simply lie fallow if 
litigants were not afforded meaningful access to the power and de-
tached reason of federal courts. 
The increasing authority with which Brennan's opinions have 
in retrospect come to stand as definitive of the Warren Court stems 
from the fact that Brennan, more than any other single justice, most 
fully assimilated the full jurisprudential consequences of the Warren 
Court's revolutionary new vision of the American polity. He 
43. Jd. at 401-02. 
44. Jd. at 415, 424. 
45. 380 u.s. 479 (1965). 
46. 379 u.s. 443 (1965). 
47. 375 u.s. 411 (1964). 
48. Brennan's concern with expanding access to federal courts persisted into the Burger 
Court era, in decisions like Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1973), which increased access 
to federal declaratory relief, and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 338 (1970), 
which pioneered the concept of the implied federal cause of action. 
It should be noted that in this respect, more than in any other, the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts have been successful in undoing Brennan's work. Although the concept of federalism 
has not yet been resurrected as an argument to limit the interpretation of substantive federal 
rights, see Sandalow, Federalism and Social Change, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 29 (1980), 
the Court after the Warren era has used the concept to limit access to federal fora. Exem-
plary is Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which used the notion of "Our Federalis?l" 
sharply to limit Dombrowski, and Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1074-75 (1989), wh1ch 
determined that a deference to the finality of state decisionmaking processes ought to seal the 
demise of Fay v. Noia. 
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grasped, with comprehensive clarity and coherence, the relationship 
between individualism and equality, the bureaucratization of gov-
ernment, and the correspondingly augmented functions of the fed-
eral judiciary. He firmly discerned that individualism required 
opposition both to the communitarianism of traditional federalism 
and to the statism that has since come to dominate the Court 
through the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Scalia.49 He was able, with what seemed almost effortless ease, to 
create apt and convincing doctrinal structures to express these new 
understandings. 
One can, of course, disagree with the substantive vision that 
underlies and supports these doctrinal structures. One can ques-
tion, for example, whether it too hastily denies the possibility of 
meaningful forms of social life intermediate between individuals and 
the bureaucratic state. One can also question the extent to which 
courts truly embody the "disinterested" reason which for Brennan 
grounds their legitimacy. But there can be no disagreement with 
the lucid and consistent manner in which Brennan's opinions un-
folded this vision and revealed its legal implications. 
BRENNAN AND THE PRAGMATIC CONCEPT OF LAW 
If Brennan's contribution to the logic of individualism ulti-
mately lay in his ability to perfect the more inchoate perceptions of 
his colleagues, his contribution to the distinctively pragmatic con-
ception of constitutional law that emerged from the Warren Court 
was of an entirely different magnitude. Brennan came to the Court 
from a career as a state judge in New Jersey, where he had acquired 
national prominence as an expert in judicial administration. His 
concern was to reform the actual functioning of the law. This focus 
affected his entire approach to law, and led him to formulate a con-
stitutional jurisprudence based upon process rather than power. 
This jurisprudence has become one of the most important legacies 
of the Warren Court. 
The jurisprudence is most clearly displayed in Brennan's inter-
pretation of the first amendment. At the time Brennan joined the 
Court, its members were embroiled in a vigorous but ultimately un-
productive debate as to whether first amendment freedoms were 
"absolutes" or whether they should be "weighed" against compet-
ing government interests in regulation.so Both sides of the debate 
viewed government interests and individual rights as locked in an 
49. For a recent example, particularly pertinent to Brennan's constitutional legacy, see 
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1597 (1990). 
50. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961). 
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indissoluble and paralyzing tension. Both sides viewed the question 
as one of ultimate government power. Brennan's distinctive and 
momentous contribution was to push the Court beyond this debate 
by introducing an entirely different focus on legal processes and 
procedures. 
The origins of this perspective can be precisely attributed to 
Brennan's opinion in Speiser v. Randal/,si which for this reason can 
be said to "stand among the most important constitutional cases of 
modern times."s2 Speiser, written during Brennan's second term on 
the Court, concerned a property tax exemption that California 
granted to those World War II veterans who executed a loyalty 
oath that they did not "advocate the overthrow of the Government 
of the United States or of the State of California by force or violence 
or other unlawful means."s3 Significantly, Brennan did not ap-
proach the case in terms of California's constitutional power to pro-
scribe the advocacy of violent revolution; he was willing to assume 
the existence of this power. 
Instead Brennan focused his analysis on the procedures used 
by California to distinguish between veterans who would and would 
not receive the tax exemption. He interpreted California law as 
placing upon veterans the burden of demonstrating that they had 
not engaged in unlawful speech. Brennan concluded that this was 
unconstitutional because it created too great a danger that lawful 
speech would be adversely affected: 
The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech falls close to the 
line separating the lawful and unlawful, the possibility of mistaken factfinding-
inherent in all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be 
penalized. The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade an-
other of the unlawfulness of his conduct necessarily must steer far wider of the 
unlawful zone than if the State must bear these burdens. This is especially to be 
feared when the complexity of the proofs and the generality of the standards applied 
... provide but shifting sands on which the litigant must maintain his position. 54 
It is no exaggeration to observe that this paragraph marks a major 
innovation in American constitutional law, one which would last-
ingly reshape the very landscape of first amendment jurisprudence. 
By focusing attention on the way in which California law actu-
ally operated, rather than upon the abstract power that could be 
said to sustain it, Speiser required the Court to conceive law as a 
51. 357 u.s. 513 (1958). 
52. Schauer, Fear, Risk. and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect", 58 
B.U.L. REv. 685, 701 (1978). See also Anastaplo, Justice Brennan. Due Process and the 
Freedom of Speech: A Celebration of Speiser v. Randall, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 7 (1986). 
53. 357 U.S. at 515. 
54. !d. at 525-26. 
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real, pragmatic instrument for social ordering instead of a transpar-
ently ideal set of commands or regulations. In Speiser Brennan suc-
ceeded in bringing his colleagues to understand the material effects 
of the California regulatory scheme on speech that all conceded was 
legitimate and constitutionally protected. This perception of law as 
concretely embedded in particular procedural settings was nothing 
less than revolutionary. 
In the years following Speiser Brennan rapidly harvested the 
implications of his insight, and in the process created the frame-
work of first amendment doctrine as we now know it. Brennan's 
focus in many of these decisions was narrowly on the procedural 
aspects of adjudication. In Freedman v. Maryland,55 for example, 
he explored the consequences for prior restraint doctrine of the tim-
ing and burden of proof at judicial hearings. In Marcus v. Search 
Warrants 56 he explored these same issues in the context of the pro-
cedures for issuing search warrants. But in other ultimately more 
significant decisions, Brennan took the radical step of using the the-
ory of Speiser to generate substantive law. 
Only two years after Speiser, for example, in Smith v. Ca/ifor-
nia,57 Brennan considered the constitutionality of a Los Angeles or-
dinance that imposed criminal penalties on booksellers for the mere 
possession of obscene writings. Although he invalidated the ordi-
nance, Brennan assumed that obscene speech could be proscribed. 
He argued, however, that the absence of a scienter provision would 
have the effect of inhibiting the sale of "books that were not ob-
scene," for "if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge 
of the contents, . . . he will tend to restrict the books he sells to 
those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a re-
striction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well 
as obscene literature. "5s 
In NAACP v. Button 59 Brennan generalized the point, arguing 
that the logic of Speiser required that "[p]recision of regulation 
must be the touchstone"60 in the regulation of speech. In a passage 
of immense influence, he coined the term "overbreadth" to describe 
an important way in which statutes could have the unacceptable 
consequence of inhibiting freedom of speech: 
The objectionable quality of vagueness and overbreadth does not depend upon ab-
sence of fair notice to a criminally accused or upon unchanneled delegation of legis-
55. 380 u.s. 51 (1964). 
56. 367 U.S. 717 (1961). 
57. 361 u.s. 147 (1959). 
58. /d. at 152-53. 
59. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
60. /d. at 438. 
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lative powers, but upon the danger of tolerating, in the area of First Amendment 
freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper 
application . . . . These freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as weU as supremely 
precious in our society. The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctions. Cf. Smith v. California, [ ]; Speiser v. 
Randall . . . . Because First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, 
government may regulate in the area only with narrow specifity.61 
The logic of Speiser also led Brennan to develop a full-blown 
theory of first amendment vagueness. Like all his colleagues, Bren-
nan had earlier understood vagueness to be a relatively toothless 
standard located in the prerequisites of due process. Indeed, in 
Roth v. United States6z he had argued that a "lack of precision" in 
the definition of obscenity was not "offensive to the requirements of 
due process" because "all that is required is that the language 'con-
veys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when 
measured by common understanding and practices . . . . ' "63 But 
the insights of Speiser would soon lead Brennan to a very different 
account of vagueness. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,64 for exam-
ple, he would argue "the defect of vagueness"6s was intolerable in 
the context of the regulation of speech, for "[w]hen one must guess 
what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one necessar-
ily will 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone . . . . ' Speiser v. 
Randall. "66 
The most important of Speiser's progeny is of course New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan.67 At issue in Sullivan was the Alabama law 
of libel, which permitted a public official to recover damages for 
defamatory statements unless the speaker could prove that the 
statements were true. Reasoning from the premises of Speiser and 
Button, Brennan had little difficulty concluding that Alabama's al-
location of the burden of proof was unconstitutional, because it 
"dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate" by in-
ducing "self-censorship."6s In Sullivan, however, Brennan took the 
unusual step of crafting a constitutional standard that would permit 
unprotected speech to be regulated, while ensuring that "freedoms 
of expression" will "have the 'breathing space' that they 'need to 
survive.' "69 He concluded that defendants could not be liable for 
damages for defamatory speech about public officials unless a plain-
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tiff could prove with "convincing clarity" that the defamation had 
been "made with 'actual malice' -that is, with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not."7o 
The "actual malice" standard makes no pretense of distin-
guishing constitutionally valuable from constitutionally valueless 
speech. It is instead "designed solely as an instrument of policy, to 
attain the specific end of minimizing the chill on legitimate 
speech."11 As such, the standard epitomizes the pragmatic concep-
tion of constitutional law, a conception whose articulation and de-
velopment can authoritatively be traced to Brennan. 72 
That conception, of course, has its disadvantages. It severs the 
connection between law and cultural norms.73 It rests on psycho-
logical assumptions about the relationship between law and behav-
ior that are difficult to predict or to verify, 74 and that as a 
consequence are also subject to strategic manipulation. The attrac-
tion of the pragmatic focus introduced by Brennan was in part due 
to its apparent accommodation of governmental interests in regula-
tion, for by sidestepping issues of ultimate power it appeared to in-
vite states to reformulate their laws with more precision and 
accuracy. This posture of accommodation offered distinct advan-
tages for an activist Court, but at root the posture was illusory. Be-
cause the empirical predicates of the "chilling effect" are always 
vague, the exact degree of constitutionally mandated precision and 
clarity can never be specified, and the constitutional test can there-
fore without explicit justification be loosened to uphold some gov-
ernment regulations and tightened to strike down others. 
These disadvantages having been noted, however, it remains 
true that the pragmatic focus introduced by Brennan to the Warren 
Court has forever altered the face of American constitutional law. 
The most significant aspect of this change is the understanding of 
law as a process, rather than merely as an abstract command of 
power. The implications of this understanding extend well beyond 
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the confines of first amendment jurisprudence. To pick only one 
outstanding example, Brennan's focus on the actual process of law 
enabled him to undermine fatally the right-privilege distinction. 
The Warren Court, at the time Brennan joined it, was still us-
ing this distinction to decide cases. 1s In Speiser, therefore, Califor-
nia had argued that the tax exemption was a "privilege" bestowed 
at the pleasure of the state, and it could for this reason also be with-
drawn by the state for any reason.76 But Brennan could effectively 
brush aside this argument because the focus of his analysis was not 
California's power to enact the tax exemption, but rather the man-
ner in which it had chosen to do so. 
In Sherbert v. Vernern Brennan consolidated this implication 
of Speiser. In Sherbert the Court considered a South Carolina law 
that was interpreted to deny unemployment compensation benefits 
to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused for religious reasons to 
work on Saturday. The State claimed that the benefits were not a 
" 'right' but merely a 'privilege.' "78 Brennan rejected this argu-
ment, and, citing Speiser, concluded "that conditions on public ben-
efits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, 
to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. "79 In 
this way Brennan's focus on the actual operation of the law enabled 
him to undercut the right-privilege distinction, and to make possible 
such important non-first amendment decisions as Shapiro v. Thomp-
son 8o and Goldberg v. Kelly.8t 
Brennan's pragmatic conception of law had yet another, and 
perhaps even more important consequence. It provided a natural 
and doctrinally legitimate avenue through which such values as em-
pathy, compassion, and justice could influence the practice of con-
stitutional law. By scrutinizing the actual operation of the law, 
Brennan could make visible and give legal significance to the misery 
and suffering caused by the welfare regulations at issue in Shapiro 
and Goldberg. The pragmatic conception of law thus allowed the 
Warren Court to give legal recognition "to the concrete human re-
alities at stake" in a case.82 
The human acknowledgment of these realities stands, of 
course, as one of the Warren Court's great achievements. If it has 
75. See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954). 
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proved tragically ephemeral, as recent decisions such as Employ-
ment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith s3 
suggest, it has nevertheless remained as the ghost at the constitu-
tional banquet of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. It has called us 
to our consciences. 
83. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). 
